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3. God and Process
REM B. EDWARDS
The central philosophical thesis of process philosophy is that process is a
fundamental element in the constitution of all actualities, both worldly and
divine. However, process thinkers do not agree about the nature of process
itself, especially in its application to God. The enduring contribution of process
theology will be the insight that process or time is a fundamental feature of
divine actuality, not some specific analysis of the nature of process or time.
What is really important is that God is in process, rather than any particular way
of conceiving of that process. As commonly recognized, in his philosophical
maturity, Whitehead conceived of two kinds of process: (1) the internal
development or becoming of individual occasions or entities, and (2) the
relation of succession between two or more individual occasions. The former he
called "becoming", "genetic process" or "concrescence;" the latter he called
"time", "change", or "transition".l Later, these notions will be further ex-
plained.
Recent process theology has been sharply divided between two views of God
and process. The dominant view, developed by Charles Hartshorne and shared
by John Cobb, applies both of the foregoing types of process to God. It
conceives of God as an everlasting society of concresceing actual occasions.
Whitehead's alternative view conceives of God as a single, everlasting, non-
temporal, actual entity. It recognizes no time or transition in God because God
is not composed of a plurality of successive occasions. Whitehead's view is
susceptible to more than one interpretation, however.
Bowman Clarke is perhaps the ablest proponent of one version of
Whitehead's view that God is a single, non-temporal, actual entity. In four
important articles, he developed and defended a version of this view and
repudiated Hartshorne's understanding of God as an infinite series of divine
actual occasions. Clarke maintains that if we are to comprehend Whitehead's
view of God's relation to process we must understand his contention that there
are two types of process. Clarke's essay titled "God and Whitehead" begins
with these words.
It is generally recognized by Alfred North Whitehead's interpreters that in
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Process and Reality he has two types of process: the genetic process of
becoming which is nontemporal, and the temporal process of transition. Not
keeping these two types of process distinct has, I fear, caused some confu-
sion in interpreting Whitehead, particularly his conception of God.2
Clarke believes that Whitehead's understanding of God is distorted if we
liken Divine process to the plurality of occasions constituting transition or time.
The only proper analogy is with the internal becoming of a single actual entity.
Whitehead's epochal theory of time does not apply to God, but his concept of
becoming does apply. As Clarke explains:
For Whitehead, God is an actual entity. This means that God, like any other
actual entity, does not change. He is where he is and what he is; he neither
changes position nor definiteness. In short, no characteristic or relation of
God changes, they merely become. This immediately raises the question:
How are the two processes, the genetic process of becoming and the
temporal process of transition, illustrative of God?3
In many published articles, Clarke has answered his own question in depth. I
will examine three elements of Whitehead's position according to Clarke,
which I also believe to be Clarke's position, each of which denies what
Hartshorne affirms about God. I shall call these (1) The No Time Factor, (2)
The No Future Factor, and (3) The No Efficient Causation (or Wimp) Factor. If
Clarke protests that he has only been explaining Whitehead's views, but not his
own, he has not made that distinction clear in his published writings.
1. THE NO TIME FACTOR
Both Whitehead and Clarke affirm the paradoxical view that concepts of time,
change, or transition do not apply to God, yet seemingly temporalistic concepts
such as becoming, process, flux, supersession, duration, etc. do apply to God
and all other actual entities. Clark affirms that in two senses the temporal
relationship of "before and after", i.e., McTaggart's "B series", does not apply
to God. It applies to the world as known by God, bur not to God himself.
First, "No before and after in God" means that nothing comes before or after
God, though God knows that events within the world are ordered in before and
after relationships. Clarke explains that
as for the process of transition, God is not a spatio-temporal part of a process
of transition. There is no actual entity before him and no actual entity after
him. He is not located in any B series. For this reason Whitehead refers to
God as the "nontemporal actual entity". He is not a member of the field of
the relation,"x is before y".a
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Next, "No before and after in God" means that in the constitution of God as a
single actual entity, there is no time, i.e., no succession of actual occasions or
activities and experiences, some of which precede or follow others. Contra
Hartshorne, God is not self-surpassing with respect to his own past states.S In
explicating this view, Clarke refers to three pages in Process and Reality where
Whitehead characterizes God as "non-temporal" (Corrected Edition, pp. 7, 32,
46; Clarke cites the 1929 edition, pp. I 7, 47 ,73). In the last two of these, "non-
temporal" is clearly applied to the primordial nature of God, leaving open the
possibility that the consequent nature is temporal. In the first reference, God is
characterized as the "primordial, non-temporal accident" of creativity. Whether
this applies only to the primordial nature is at least a matter of interpretation. In
denying temporality to God on textual grounds, Clarke ignores one important
passage from Adventures of ldeas in which Whitehead refers to "The everlast-
ing nature of God, which is in a sense non-temporal and in another sense is
temporal".6 Where temporality involves futurity, Clarke cannot admit that the
everlasting nature of God is temporal.
It is peculiar, to say the least, that in some passages Whitehead seems to deny
that both God and individual actual occasions are temporal, while applying to
both such temporalistic terminology as "process", "becoming", "flux",
"supersession", and "duration". This oddity is partly resolved if we realize that
Whitehead is not speaking ordinary English. Instead, he is speaking his own
technical Whiteheadianese. What did he mean by both "time" and "becoming?"
Whitehead first introduced his "epochal theory of time" in the revisions
which he added to the initial Lowell Lectures in Science and the ModeruWorld.
There he distinguished between epochal durationsT or actual occasions8 on, the
one hand, and their succession, on the other. Time was defined as "sheer
succession of epochal durations".e This definition of time illuminates
Whitehead's puzzling remark in Process and Reality that the "genetic passage
from phase to phase is not in physical time",10 for here the topic is the becom-
ing of a single epoch. Since time is a relationship of succession between two or
more epochs, a single epoch, i.e., a single term of that relationship, is not in
time.
Though not in time, each epoch is nevertheless a quantum of becoming or
process with temporal duration. How then does becoming differ from time in
more than terminology? This has not been an easy question for Whitehead's
interpreters to answer. Whitehead lrclieved that a certain minimal quantum or
atom of spatio-temporal duration is required for there to be anything actual at
all, as Clarke himself acknowledges.ll Actual occasions, these minimal
durations, have a specious or extended present. In Whitehead's words, they
have "temporal extensiveness", or "temporal thickn€Ss",l2 i.e., they take time,
though they are not in time.
Although whole occasions are not in fact infinitely divided, they are neverthe-
less conceptually divisible into an infinite number of successive parts. As
Whitehead explained, "In every act of becoming there is the becoming of
something with temporal extension; but ... the act itself is not extensive, in the
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sense that it is divisible into earlier and later acts of becoming which correspond
to the extensive divisibility of what has become".13 Here "temporal" applies to
the epoch of becoming as a finished product, but not to its internal becoming.
Presumably, Whitehead distinguished between the "first temporal half' and the
"second temporal half' of the satisfaction of an actual entity only from the
perspective of the finished product.la
Yet, we must ask, is there no real internal succession, no application of
earlier and later, to the process of becoming itself? Granted that "temporal"
applies technically to the succession of occasions, might there not be another
kind of succession, a sense that is internal to the self-development of occasions?
If so, it would be temporal in some more ordinary sense that takes all metaphysi-
cal processes of succession to be temporal.
What could the elements of internal succession be? Clarke denies that
Whitehead's "phases" in the process of self-development of occasions are
temporally successive.15 He tells us that It
would be ... nonsense to say of Whitehead's three phases that first in time
we have the conformal phase, and later in time this phase is supplemented,
and after this supplementation, later in time, we have the satisfaction. As we
have suggested, it is the first phase, the phase of inheritance, that locates the
experience in space-time, and these spatiotemporal relations hold throughout
the process of becoming and are exhibited in the satisfaction.16
It is difficult to determine whether to agree or disagree with Clarke in
denying that the phases in the development of an occasion are successive.
Clarke acknowledges that Whitehead himself used such words as "successive",
"earlier" and "later" in describing the phases. However, Clarke reminds us that
Whitehead was a mathematician and insists that his terminology was mathemati-
cal or logical in import, but not temporal.lz Of course, this is an interpr"etation
that goes beyond the language of the text itself. Yet it is a plausible interpreta-
tion. An equally plausible interpretation would be that there is a sequence of
phases in the self-creative process of becoming. I doubt that we know which
interpretation was that of Whitehead himself, and I see no way to settle this
dispute merely by being faithful to the texts.
Perhaps we must turn to our own experience of time to determine whether
Whitehead's phases follow one another, but even here I get little help. My own
experience of time is much more Bergsonian than Whiteheadian. Hartshorne
recognized that Dewey, Bergson, Peirce, Husserl, and Heidegger "found no
definite discreteness in the becoming of human experience".l8 I too experience
specious presents as interpenetrating rather than distinct.l9 Of course, the
interpenetration is directional and causal, moving from past toward future. I do
experience the present moment as specious, extended, not infinitesimally thin.
Yet (to use a spatial metaphor), the leading and trailing edges of the present
moment are not sharply defined; and a sequential and self-causal reckoning
with data and with possibilities seems integral to what is happening now.
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Thus, my experience of time fails to confirm the thesis that data, determina-
tion, and definiteness do not succeed one another within a single atomic
occasion. Actually, I have never been able even to find or to inspect a single
atomic occasion or to tell whether I have one of them, two of them, or several
of them on hand. I have no clear answer to the question of what individuates
occasions or how they develop, for I am not at all sure that events are sharply
individuated or atomized in Whitehead's sense.
If, as Clarke suggests, occasions are individuated by their subjective aims,20
this might explain why God, who has an infinite subjective aim at the creation
of and intensification of intrinsic value, can be only a single infinite and
inexhaustible actual entity. However, it might open the door to the possibility
and probability that entities within the world with prolonged projects (e.9.,
human subjects) are enduring actual entities with durations lasting years instead
of mere fractions of secorrds.2l It might even open the door to subjective
immortality for human persons if some of our aims or projects are inexhaust-
ible. After all these years of exposure to process thought, I for one still suspect
at times that I might be a single enduring subject having many experiences
rather than being a vast society of subjects every second, each having only one
experience. And from the fact that there seems to be a minimal temporal
threshold to our perceptual abilities (about ten or so flashes per second), I
suspect that the only thing that follows is that there are minimal limits to our
abilities to perceive, but not that there are minimal atomic limits to our exist-
ence. Normally, however, I just try to suppress such thoughts.
Although Clarke denies that the relation, x is before y, applies to the phases
of concrescence, he affirms that this relation does hold between "prehensions
within an actual entity".22 Let us recall that Whitehead defined prehensions as
"concrete facts of relatedness".23 According to Clarke, many prehensions, many
concrete facts of experienced relatedness, may come before or after one another
within a single concrescence. With this I agree, at least to the extent that I am
able to singleize specious presents.
As we have seen, Clarke insists that "process" in God be understood by
analogy with the becoming or concrescence of a single actual occasion, not by
analogy with time or transiti on.24 We must now ask: Does Clarke hold that God
is a single actual entity whose own everlasting process of concrescence consists
of an infinite sequence of "before and after" prehensions, i.e., of concrete facts
of experienced relatedness to the world, in God's consequent nature? As best I
can determine, he holds that this is false but that something like it is true. His
position is that the world that God prehends consists of "before and after"
occasions, but that God's own experienced prehensions of this world are not
ordered into "before and after" relations.25
Whitehead wrote that God's consequent nature is "always in concrescence
and never in the past".26 Clarke emphasizes the "never in the past" aspect of
this quote, but what could he mean by "always in concrescence"? There are
actually at least fwo views of God as a single, everlasting, actual entity who is
always in concrescence. The first I shall call the theory of Continuous Concres-
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cence. The second I shall call the theory of Completed Concrescence, which is
Clarke's view, though Clarke himseif does not use the label.
The theory of God as Continuous Concrescence, which I believe to have been
Whitehead's own view, is that God is a single everlasting and continuously
concresceing actual entity, but not an infinitely rich society of perishing actual
occasions. God is everlasting, without beginning and without end. Nothing
comes before or after God, but God's prehensions of and decisions about
occasions in the world, as well as those worldly occasions themselves, do come
before and after one another. Without perishing as a subject, without loss of
subjective immediacy, and without loss of objects prehended, God continuously
interacts with the world and is continuously enriched by it.
Whitehead wrote that in process thought: The ancient doctrine that "no one
crosses the same river twice" is extended. No thinker thinks twice; and to put
the matter more generally, no subject experiences twice. This is what Locke
ought to have meant by his doctrine of time as "perpetual perishing".:z
Since "perpetual perishing" does not apply to God, according to Whitehead,
it is clear that "no subject experiences twice" is true only of occasions within
the world which can and do perish, but not of God.
As I understand him, Whitehead conceived of God as an enduring subject
who experiences and acts more than once, one who is always in concrescence in
relation to a constantly developing world, one whose prehensions of that world
succeed one another, one who experiences and acts twice 
- 
indeed an infinite
number of times 
- 
but without ever perishing as a subject, without ever losing
subjective immediacy. On the Continuous Concrescence view, God is in
immediate, i.e., contemporary and independent, unison of becoming with each
occasion in the world as it enjoys its own "moment of sheer individuality"2t
and creative self-development. While never losing subjective immediacy, God
receives all worldly happenings into God's consequent nature as they perish,
thereby giving them enduring objective immortality and making them thereafter
everlasting in God.29
Some features of the theory of Continuous Concrescence were developed by
William Christian, though with complications with respect to "satisfactions"
which I do not accept. I have expressed my own preference for this theory in
one published article;30 but it is not the view of Bowman Clarke. In contrasting
Christian's position with that of John Cobb, who shares the societal view with
Hartshorne, Clarke wrote:
What Christian is doing 
- 
in saying that actual occasions do not change and
perish, but God changes and does not perish 
- 
is to atomize the everlasting
satisfaction into a sequence of finite satisfactions. As he puts it, God's
satisfaction "is not timelessly one, determinate, and final. It is a living
experience. But rtis alway,s one, determinate, and final" (300).... In other
words, the everlasting actual entity is not one. His satisfaction is shattered
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into a sequence of finite specific satisfactions, each different for each finite
occasion. At this point, I must confess, I would be hard pressed to distin-
guish between Cobb's and Christian's resolution of Cobb's difficulties. What
Christian calls an everlasting actual entity which changes by virtue of a
seguence of finite specific satisfactions, Cobb calls a society of finite actual
occasions, sequentially ordered.3'
My own position differs from Christian's, and agrees with Clarke's, in
focusing on prehensions rather than satisfactions; and it does not reduce God to
a society of actual occasions. I am not even sure that the world is reducible to
societies of actual occasions! God is a continuously concresceing, unperishing,
and everlasting unitary subject of prehensions that are in principle interminable,
for God's creativity can never be exhausted. Thus, I agree with Clarke that
God's prehensions are successive, but my differences with him about God will
become apparent as I now move to discuss both the "No Future Factor" and the
"No Causation (or Wimp) Factor".
Clarke holds a theory of Completed rather than a theory of Continuous
Divine Concrescence. He insists that, contrary to St. Thomas Aquinas, God
knows events within the world to be ordered in before and after relations. Yet,
Clarke maintains that Whitehead's God is like the God of Aquinas and other
classical theologians in containing or including all time all at once.32 Clarke
explains that the
difference in terminology between "eternal" and "everlasting" is important
for Whitehead. It allows God in his fullness to be, in contrast to St.
Thomas's simultaneous whole, an everlasting whole, one present, compris-
ing all time and having duration of succession.33
An important difference, however, is that, according to Whitehead, the
consequent nature of God is "incomplate;"34 whereas Clarke's God, who
comprises all time, is complete and changeless from eternity. Clarke's God has
no indeterminate future because his God has no future at all.
2. THE NO FUTURE FACTOR
When Clarke explains how there can be transition and supersession in God, he
tells us that all the "before and after" relationships in nature are known to be
such by God, but there are no "before and after" relations in God's own
experience, that "In short, all the B series are tenselessly in God's consequent
nature and there ordered temporally in the vivid immediacy of one 'here-
rrr ?5now .'-
Clarke denies that McTaggart's "A series", i.e., the ordering of events into
past, present, and future, applies to God at all. The objecrs of God's experience
are in "serial order", but "past, present, and future" do not apply to the order of
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God's experiences themselves. Thus "all of nature" is present in its entirety to
God, but none of it is past, and none of it is future.36 Clarke clearly subscribes
to the theory of what I call Completed Concrescence. His notion of a serial
order of before and after relations which are knowable as present is extremely
helpful in the attempt to understand Whitehead's claim that in God there is no
past,37 but I find it very troublesome if extended to the claim that in God there
is no future.
In several articles,3S Clarke endorses passages from Whitehead's early work
The Concept of Nature, published in 1920 before he developed his own
distinctive process metaphysics. There Whitehead referred to an "imaginary
being" whose awareness embraces all the facts of time "as in their temporal
serial order", whose mind "suffers no transition", and is "free from passage",
who contemplates "all nature as an immediate fact", and whose present moment
is specious, like ours. except that for the imaginary being "all nature shares in
the immediacy of our present duration".3g Clarke repeatedly affirms that the
God of Process and Reali4r is identical with the "imaginary being" of The
Concept of Nature who embraces all of time all at once, though in serial order,
and for whom all nature is an immediate fact. He says that "This imaginary
being of The Concept of Nature becomes the God of Process and Realiry ...".40
I wish to challenge this claim on several grounds.
First, with the loss of any future, and thus of an open future in God, it seems
to me that all the important gains of process metaphysics and theology are lost
in one "swell foop". While admitting that Clarke's theory of Completed
Concrescence is a plausible interpretation of Whitehead, especially in light of
the obscurity of many of Whitehead's pronouncements, I would like to develop
an interpretation which preserves the gains.
Most interpreters of Whitehead would agree that we can conceive of God's
present experience as specious or extended without going to the extreme of
making its duration co-extensive with all of time all at once. I do not wish to
speculate here about the duration of God's specious present,4l but I am
convinced that the classical view of a God who timelessly experiences all time
is precisely what Whitehead abandoned when he began to reflect on theological
themes in Process and Reality. Clarke acknowledges that his argument for the
thesis that God is timeless process is largely textual.42 However, there are
important texts in Whitehead which cannot be reconciled with Clark's identifica-
tion of the "imaginary being" of The Concept of Nature with the God who is
both primordial and consequent in nature in Process and Reality. The latter God
is an enduring subject who continuously assimilates novel data from the world
as time marches on without losing subjective immediacy. However, this God is
not timelessly complete with respect to an awareness of the entire past, present,
and future of the universe. Whitehead wrote that "The most general formulation
of the religious problem is the question whether the process of the temporal
world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound together in an order
in which novelty does not mean loss".43 Whitehead found God to be the
ultimate solution to this religious problem.44 However, on Clarke's view of
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Completed Concrescence, there can be no solution, for the simple reason that
there can be no novelty for the God who timelessly is what is yet to be.
Whitehead wrote that God "shares with every new creation its actual world; and
the concrescent creature is objectified in God as a novel element in God's
objectification of that actual world".45 Yet, there can be no novel elements for a
God whose present embraces all the future.
Contrary to Clarke, the Whitehead of Process and Reali4, does not say that
God prehends the whole of time, past, present, and future, all at once. Instead,
God prehends the world only as the world develops, but not in advance.
Whitehead affirms that God's consequent nature "evolves in its relationship to
the evolving world", and that only the primordial conceptual nature has "eternal
completion".46 According to Whitehead, God's "derivative nature is consequent
upon the creative advance of the world".47 Yet on Clarke's theory of Completed
Concrescence, the eternally complete world makes no creative advance. Clarke
can make no place at all for the following extremely important text from
Process and Reality:
Neither God, nor the World, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip
of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty.
Either of them, God and the World, is the instrument of novelty for the other.48
Clarke's God with no future has reached static completion without novelty,
but this is not Whitehead's God.
In the concluding theological chapter of Process and Realiry, Whitehead
clearly distinguished his own concept of God from that of theologians who
make God's perspective on the fluent world static or complete, thereby making
fluency or time itself ultimately an illusion. He wrote that
The vicious separation of the flux from the permanence leads to the concept
of an entirely static God, with eminent reality, in relation to an entirely fluent
world, with deficient reality. But if the opposites, static and fluent, have once
been so explained as separately to characterize diverse actualities, the
interplay between the thing which is static and the things which are fluent
involved a contradiction at every step in its explanation. Such philosophies
must include the notion of illusion' as a fundamental principle 
- 
the notion
of ' mere appearance'.ae
Clarke's temporally complete God with no indeterminate future seems to me
to be just such an entirely static God, in relation to whom the flux of the world
is reduced to illusion or mere appearance, even if that illusive flux is ordered
into "before and after" relations.
Most seriously of all, Clarke's interpretation of Whitehead rules out free and
creative creaturely choices, and it deprives process theology of all of the
advantages of the "free will defense" in resolving the problem of theodicy.5o If
God's knowledge of the world is complete even with respect to the future, this
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implies that from some ultimate point of view, all the "before and after"
relationships of the future are fully actual and fully determinate. From God's
perspective of Completed Concrescence, there is no indeterminate or open
future, even though there might appear to be from our limited perspective in
space-time. If it is objected that this misses the whole point, which is that the
concept of the future just does not apply to God, the response is that however it
is worded, Clarke assumes that there is a timeless and inclusive divine perspec-
tive on the world within which all the occasions and decisions made in all of
time are fully concrete and determinate. This feature of classical theology,
incorporated by Clark into the thinking of Whitehead himself, rules out free and
creative acts of choice; for they simply are not there to be known until they are
made, from any point of view, timeless or not. Clarke's view of God loses two
of the principle advantages of process theology: (l) its reconciliation of Divine
Actuality with human freedom by making a place for Divine Potentiality, and
(2) its account of human, not Divine, responsibility for our choices of good and
evil.
Now, I do not doubt that Clarke wants to believe in human freedom and
responsibility, for he tells us that
The past, relative to a particular event, is fixed and settled; it is what has
become actual. The present, relative to a particular event, is what is becom-
ing actual. But future events must wait to see how the present becomes
actual. There is freedom, to some degree, in the becoming of any actual
entity, and consequently, in any event. Thus the B series becomes fixed in its
tenseless manner as events become.sl
The difficulty, as I see it, is that this is all relative to the perspective of
particular events within the world. The crucial question is whether the future is
indeterminate relative to the ultimate perspective of God. Since the God of The
Concept of Nature contemplates "all nature as an immediate fact", there is no
open future from the ultimate divine point of view. Any finite perspective
which believes otherwise is mere illusion. Clarke's position implies that for
God the future is not future because it is present, and it is not open because it is
fully determinate and complete. Any universe in which a// events are absolutely
ordered in "before and after" relations is still what William James would have
called a "block-universe" with no open possibilities, incompatible with human
freedom and creativity.
Clarke is committed to the dubious metaphysical thesis that from our point of
view in the world, free and creative future decisions oppear as not yet made;
nevertheless, iru reality they already have been made and exist in God timelessly
but sequentially in their full concreteness. My own view, which I share with
Hartshorne, is that free and creative future decisions which have not yet been
made are simply not there to be known from any point of view, divine or
otherwise.
In his early book titled Language and Natural Theology, published in 1966,
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Clarke was more under the influence of Hartshorne than Whitehead. There
Clarke rejected the very theology to which he now subscribes on the grounds
that it does not take time seriously. To quote Clarke against Clarke:
There is ... an alternative interpretation of God and omniscience which
follows Whitehead's admonition to take time seriously, and an interpretation
which itself needs to be taken seriously. This view maintains that the content
of God's knowledge changes with the changing, contingent facts of the
world. If omniscience means to know, at any moment, all that there is to
know and if time is not an illusion, then to know future contingents as
indeterminate and future, relative to some past and fully determined
actuality, is certainly an acceptable meaning of the term 'omniscience'. But
does this imply that God is ignorant of the future? No; as Hartshorne points
out, "... this implies that he (is)'ignorant' only if it is assumed that events
are there to be known prior to their happenings".s2
It is only the most recent Clarke who presumes that future events are
timelessly there to be known. Finally, Clarke offers at least one serious
philosophical argument against the idea that the future is indeterminate for God.
If we conceive of God's present experience of the world as
extended through all of space during its duration, ... then contrary to the
theory of relativity, absolute space and time have been reintroduced into the
physical world. We have a definition of absolute simultaneous spaces,
namely, those in the divine experiences. By way of them it is easy to define
an absolute past and an absolute future, namely, God's past and future of
each simultaneous space in his divine experiences. And this, of course, is
what Newton did call absolute space and time, namely, the sensorium of
God.53
Well, a unified divine perspective on all of space is not quite what Newton
meant by absolute space and time, for Newton's absolute space and time were
something actual and completely uniform quite apart from any spatio-temporal
contents or events, as Whitehead himself pointed out.54 Process theology is not
encumbered by such assumptions. Nevertheless, giving God a present ex-
perience of all of space does have the effect, as Lewis Ford has expressed it, of
undermining "the foundations of relativity physics and its definition of simul-
taneity". Presumably Clarke would agree with Ford in finding "the conceptual
costs" of this metaphysics to be "far too high".55
I see no reason why relativity should be a problem for an omnipresent God,
even if it is assuredly a problem for localized observers traveling in different
space-time frames who have no way of correlating their watches. If God's
specious present were sufficiently extended to give an experience of a cosmic
present moment, nothing would be different for physics as a human enterprise,
though God's physics might be quite different from ours. At least we should ask
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this question, with Hartshorne: "can physics, judging reality from the standpoint
of localized observers, give us the deep truth about time as it would appear to a
non-localized obse ry er?"56
Frankly, I do not see how the problem of avoiding absolute space and time is
solved by,Clarke's God who is "an everlasting whole, one present, comprising
all time".57 Instead of appearing at the level of McTaggart's "A series" of past-,
present, and future, absolute space-time reappears for Clarke at the level of the
"B series" in which all worldly events have absolutely fixed "earlier or later"
relations in God. If each worldly event has a determinate "earlier or later"
position in a timelessly complete B series, that seems to be just about as non-
relativistic as anything that Hartshorne has to offer, if not more so.
3. THE NO CAUSATION (OR WrMp) FACTOR
According to Whitehead, the world acts upon God, and God acts upon the
world. In his words, "ft is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the
World creates God".58 In describing the "consequent nature" of God,
Whitehead tells us that "there is a reaction of the worid on God. The completion
of God's nature into a fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectifica-
tion of the world in God".59 Whitehead describes the "superjective nature" of
God as "the character of the pra-qmatic value of his specific satisfaction
qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances".60 He
wrote that after the multitude of worldly events have gained objective immor-
tality in God, there is a final creative phase in which
the creative action completes itself. For the perfected actuality passes back
into the temporal world and qualifies this world so that each temporal
actuality includes it as an immediate tact of relevant experience. For the
kingdom of heaven is with us today. The action of the forth phase is the love
of God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular occasions.
What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the
reality in heaven passes back into the world.6l
Oddly enough, Clarke denies that God and the world ever act causally upon
one another. His view is that God acts upon the world only as a final cause, but
not as an efficient cause, and that the world acts upon God through a non-causal
variety of physical prehensions.
Now it is true that Whitehead's God acts upon the world as a final cause. He
described God as "the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his
vision of truth, beauty, and goodness".62 God provides each worldly occasion
with its initial subjective aim, its possibilities for decision, weighted (but not
irresistibly so) toward the good.63 However, I have difficulty with Clarke's
claim that God acts upon the world only as final cause and never as efficient
cause. He informs us that "God has no causal past, no causal future, and no
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causal contemporaries .... God is not a member of any causal chain of efficient
causality.... God influences the temporal occasions by final causality".64
Clarke presupposes that an absolute separation of final and efficient causation is
possible within a Whiteheadian framework. However, Whitehead explained that
occasions receive their aims from God through "hybrid physical feelings" of
God's conceptual feelings.65 This means that every transmission of God's ideas
to occasions within the world involves a degree of efficient as well as final
causation, and that Clarke is mistaken in thinking that the latter is possible
without the former.66
I suppose that part of my objection to Clarke's rejection of divine efficient
causation is a religious one, though I also think that it is adequately grounded in
Whiteheadian texts and sound philosophy as well. The language used in texts
previously cited dealing with the world's effects on God and with God's
superjective nature is most plausibly interpreted as causal language, and so too
when Whitehead says that the "consequent nature" of God "results from his
physical prehension of the derivative actual entities", and that it "receives a
reaction from the world".67 I do not agree with Clarke that all this seemingly
causal terminology can be written off as merely "poetic language".68
On religious grounds, rejecting divine efficient causation and making God
only a final cause has its uses in theodicy, as David Griffin has shown.6e If
God's power over the world is "merely persuasive and not coercive", then God
is not causally responsible for evil since God is not causally responsible for
anything. Yet, we must ask whether this is the ideally desirable form of divine
power over the world, whether a God who exercises only persuasive and no
efficient causation over the world could be that being than whom none greater
could be conceived. In his younger days, Clarke himself emphasized the
religious importance of the idea of a supremely worshipful being who can
command or merit "the love of all our heart, soul, mind and strength, that is our
total devotion".To
Surely there are many thoughtful believers who would expect more than final
causation of a supremely worshipful divinity. Who could worship such a wimp?
According to the "only final causation" view, God is merely a super-celestial
George Bush who expounds exalted ideals concerning domestic well-being like
a Democrat but who bud_eets to support them like a chintzy Republican. A God
of final causation alone proliferates inspirations but does nothing 
- 
hardly a
God than whom none greater can be conceived, just as George Bush is hardly a
President than whom none greater can be conceived.
Just how far process theologians should go in assigning efficient causation to
God is a matter for honest disagreement, but surely not so far as to undermine
human freedom, creativity, and responsibility. Hartshorne gives God a limited
efficient causal role in establishing those basic laws of natureTl that would
make for a worthwhile world. He tells us that "Adequate cosmic power is
power to set conditions which are maximally favorable to desirable decisions on
the part of local &gents".72 Miracles have been unpopular with most modern
thinkers, including process theologians. I suggest that process theologians
54 Rem B. Edwards
should reconsider the possibility that God might work an occasional miracle or
two 
- 
just enough to announce God's presence, but not so many as to make us
depend on God to solve our problems for us and deprive us of responsibility for
managing our own affairs.
As for the world's effects on God, one of the most religiously attractive
features of process theology is Hartshorne's "doctrine of contributionism", i.e.,
the doctrine that the world acts upon God and ultimately contributes to God all
of the intrinsic value achieved in the world; that our love, worship and glorifica-
tion of God do somehow make a real and important difference to God.73 Clarke
once felt the allure of contributionism. He wrote in his early Language and
Nqtural Theology rhat
Such a conception of God and time has serious implications also, for
religion. One of the major elements in worship is the act of sacrifice 
- 
the
contributing to that which inspires our total commitment and devotion. If we
cannot change the content of God's experience and knowledge, how can it
be said that we contribute anything to him.... To contribute, if it means
anything, means to add something which was not there before. And is not
Hartshorne right when he says of religion, "the basic religious view is that
man's good acts and happiness have a value to the supreme being which our
bad acts and misery do not". (Man's Vision of God, pp. 134-135). Unless
our moral acts and religious acts of worship can contribute something real to
the knowledge and experience of God which was not there before, in short,
unless time is real, morality and religion are in danger of becoming less than
empty gestures; they are in danger of becoming a meaningless activity and a
sham.Ta
Has the more recent Clarke, who cannot make a place for something "which
was not there before" in God, abandoned contributionism entirely. I think not,
but I also fear that he is on the brink of having done so. The latest Clarke would
like to save the doctrine that the intrinsic goodness of the world is ultimately
contributed to God and preserved and cherished by God forever. He does so
through the implausible claims that there are non-causal modes of physical
prehension of concrete actualities, and that it is through such a non-causal mode
of prehension that God prehends the world and its worth. In his 1986 article
titled "Hartshorne on God and Physical Prehensions", Clarke argued very
persuasively that although Hartshorne regards all prehension as involving
efficient causation, Whitehead himself distinguished "between two types of
physical prehensions, causal and presentational".T5 Presentational prehensions,
like our sensory perception of the contemporat) world, are non-causal, for
contemporaniety simply means causal independence by definition.T6 Clarke
maintains that God's physical prehensions of the world are not causal, that they
are only presentational, involving conformation or reproduction but not time
and causation.TT
Clarke has convinced me that Whitehead believed in non-causal physical
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prehensions of concrete actualities. He has not convinced me that such non-
causal prehensions really exist. Surely we are not to accept them merely on
Whitehead's authority. All experienced concrete facts of relatedness with which
I am familiar are causal in nature, including experience of the near contem-
porary world given to us in sensation, a world so near in the past that for
practical purposes we take it to be present. Without non-causal prehensions of
concrete facts, only causal prehensions remain to explain how the world can
contribute something to God, and how God can contribute something to the
world. I can make no sense of the claim that the world and God affect one
another without affecting one another.
In conclusion, it seems to me that process theology could survive a sig-
nificant modification of the epochal theory of time as applied to both God and
the world. However, if its gains are to be preserved, God must be assigned an
infinitely prolonged, creative, and incomplete future, and both God and the
world must be understood to act causally and creatively upon one another.
NOTES
l. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, corrected ed. (New York: The Free
Press, 1978), pp. 2lG-215.
2. Bowman L. Clarke, "God as Process in Whitehead", in Bowman L. Clarke and Eugene
T. Long, eds., God and Temporality (New York: Paragon House, 1984), p. 169.
3. Ibid., p. 180.
4. Ibid., p. 180; Bowman Clarke, "Process, Time and God", Process Stu.dies 13 (1983):
258.
5. Ibid., p. 185.
6. Alfred North Whitehead, Adt,entures of ldeas (New York: The Free Press, 1967),p.
208.
1.
8.
9.
10.
ll.
Alfred North Whitehead, Science and Modern World (New York: The Free Press,
1967),p.124.
Ibid., p. 158.
Ibid., p. 124. See also p. 126.
Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 283.
Clarke, "God as Process in Whitehead", p. 173; "Process, Time and God", p.247.
Bowman Clarke, "Hartshorne on God and Physical Prehensions", Tulane Studies in
Philosophv XXXIV (1986): 34,35.
Whitehead , Process and Reality, pp. 77 , 169.
Ibid., p. 69.
Ibid.
Clarke, "God as Process in Whitehead", pp. 178, l79. "Process, Time and God", pp.
251-255. "God and Time in Whitehead", pp. 57C-571.
Clarke, "Process, Time and God", p.253.
Ibid., p. 259, n. 4-
Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (La Salle: Open Court
Publishing Co., 1970), p.192.
In his An Introduction to Metaphysics, describing the successive moments of the flux of
experience, Bergson wrote that "they were so solidly organized, so profoundly
animated with a common life, that I could not have said where any one of them finished
or where another commenced. In reality no one of them begins or ends, but all extend
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
t7.
18.
19.
56 Rem B. Edwards
into each other. Harold A. Larrabee, ed., Selections from Bergson (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 6.
20. Clarke, "God and Time in Whitehe&d", p. 572; "Process, Time, and God", p. 255
"Hartshorne on God and Physical Prehensions", p. 39.
21. For further development of this suggestion, see Rem B. Edwards, "The Human Self: An
Actual Entity or a Society", Process Studies 5 (1975): 195-203.
22. Clarke, "God as Process in Whitehead", p. 178.
23. Clarke, "Hartshorne on God and Physical Prehensions", pp. 30, 31.
24. Clarke, "God as Process in Whitehead", p. 180.
25. Clarke, "Process, Time, and God", p. 258.
26. Whitehead, Process and Reality,p. 180.
27.[bid.,p.29.
28. Whitehead, Adventures of ldeas,p. 177.
29. Whitehead, Process and Reality,p.347.
30. Edwards, "The Human Self: An Actual Entity or a Society?", pp. 195-203.
31. Clarke, "God and Time in Whitehead", p. 568.
32. Clarke, "God as Process in Whitehead", pp. 183-185; "Hartshorne on God and Physical
Prehensions", p. 36.
33. Clarke, "God as Process in Whitehead", p. 184.
34. Whitehead, Process ond Reality, p. 345.
35. Ibid., p. 182.
36. Clarke, "Hartshorne on God and Physical Prehensions", p. 35.
37. Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 31, 87.
38. Clarke, "Process, Time, and God", pp.255-256; "God as Process in Whiteheod", pp
180-181; "Hartshorne on God and Physical Prehensions", p. 35.
39. Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 197 l), pp. 67, 69.
40. Clarke, "Process, Time and God", p.256.
41. I have discussed this problem in my "The Human Self: An Actual Entity or a Society",
p.203.
42. Clarke, "God and Time in Whitehead", p. 564.
43. Whitehead, Process and Reality,p.340.
44. Ibid., p. 350.
45. Ibid., p.345.
46. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
47.[bid.,p.345.
48. Ibid., p.349.
49. Ibid., pp.346,347.
50. I am aware that Clarke himself has made full and eloquent use of the "free will defense"
in his essay titled "A Whiteheadian Theodicy", in John K. Roth and Frederick Sontag,
eds.,The Defense of God (New York: Paragon House, 1985), pp.3247.
5l . Clarke, "God as Process in Whitehe ad" , p. 177 .
52. Bowman L. Clarke, Language and Natural Theology (The Hague: Mouton & Company,
1966), pp. 115-116. The quote is from Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964), p.98.
53. Clarke, "Hartshorne on God and Physical Prehensions", p. 37.
54. Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp.7V72.
55. Lewis Ford, "God as a Temporally-Ordered Society: Some Objections",Tulane Studies
in Philosopfty XXXN (1986): 45.
56. Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method,p. 125.
57. Clarke, "God as Process in Whitehead", p. 184.
58. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 348.
59. Ibid., p.345.
60. Ibid., p. 88.
God and Process 57
61 . tbid., p. 351.
62. Ibid., p.346.
63. Ibid., pp. 108, 224,244,283.
64. Clarke, "Process, Time, and God", pp.257 ,258.
65. Whiteh ead, P r oc es s and R ea lity, pp. 24647, 250.
66. I am indebted to a conversation with Don Sherbume for this insight.
67. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 31.
68. Clarke, "Hartshorne on God and Physical Prehensions", p. 38.
69. David Griffin, God, Power and Evil, A Process Theodicy (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1976), pp. 280, 281.
70. Clarke, Language and Natural Theology, pp. 103-107.
71. Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1984), p. I 18.
72. Charles Hartshome, The Divine Relatit,it.t (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948),
p. 135.
73. See Charles Hartshorne, "The Ethics of Contributionism", in Responsibilities to Future
Generations: Environmental Ethics, Emest Partridge, ed. (Buffalo: Prometheus Books,
1981), pp. 103-107. See also Hartshome,The Divine Relativity,pp.46,58, 124, 128,
130, 131, 133, 141.
74. Clarke, Language and Natural Theology, pp. I 13, 1 14.
75. Clarke, "Hartshorne on God and Physical Prehensions", p. 32.
76. rbid.
77. lbid., p. 38.
